Now or Never: Environmental Protection under Hyperbolic Discounting by Ralph Winkler et al.
Vol. 3, 2009-12 | April 9, 2009 | http://www.economics-ejournal.org/economics/journalarticles/2009-12      
Now or Never: Environmental Protection under 
Hyperbolic Discounting 
Ralph Winkler 
Center of Economic Research at ETH Zurich 
Abstract 
The author analyzes the optimal investment in environmental protection in a model of 
non-overlapping hyperbolically discounting agents. He shows that, in the long run and 
in the absence of a commitment device, society is stuck in a situation where all agents 
prefer further investments, yet no agent invests. This holds no matter whether agents 
are aware of the time inconsistency of their preferences. As a consequence, awareness 
of the time-inconsistency problem poses at best a short run remedy. Moreover, such an 
outcome may be Pareto inefficient and may explain the weak performance of long-run 
environmental policies. 
Special issue “Discounting the Long-Run Future and Sustainable Development” 
JEL: D90, Q50, Q58 
Keywords: Environmental policy; environmental protection; hyperbolic discounting, 
Markov perfect equilibria; time-inconsistency 
Correspondence  
Ralph Winkler, CER-ETH – Center of Economic Research at ETH Zurich, ZUE D4, 
CH-8092 Zurich, Switzerland, mail@ralph-winkler.de  
The author is grateful to Fabio Antoniou, Stefan Baumgärtner, Vangelis Dyikitopoulos, 
Jürgen Eichberger, Malte Faber, Hans Gersbach, Larry Karp, Ulf Moslener, John 
Proops, Maik Schneider and Christian Traeger for valuable comments on an earlier 
draft. Financial support by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (German Research 
Foundation) under the graduate programme “Environmental and Resource 
Economics” and by the European Commission under the Marie Curie Intra-European 
Fellowship scheme, No. MEIF-CT-2003-501536, is gratefully acknowledged. 
 
 
 
 
© Author(s) 2009. Licensed under a Creative Commons License - Attribution-NonCommercial 2.0 Germany
 Economics: The Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal 1
1 Introduction
A ubiquitous feature in environmental economics is that welfare costs and beneﬁts
of projects undertaken to mitigate environmental problems spread over decades or
even centuries (e.g., global climate change, biodiversity loss, depletion of the ozone
layer and disposal of radioactive waste). With the standard exponential discounting
approach, ﬁrst introduced by Samuelson (1937) and put on an axiomatic basis by
Debreu (1954) and Koopmans (1960), outcomes in the far distant future are worth
close to nothing for any positive discount rate. In many people’s view this is not the
way we do think or should think about the far distant future. Therefore, discounting
has been a controversial topic, with proposals ranging from ad-hoc adjustments
to alternative axiomatic derivations (Lind, 1982, Rabl, 1996, Portney and Weyant,
1999, Heal, 1998).
One recent approach to deal with the shortcomings of exponential discounting
is hyperbolic discounting, i.e., the discount rate is not constant but declining over
time. It has been advocated for three reasons (for an overview see Pearce et al.,
2003, Groom et al., 2005). First, empirical evidence suggests that decision makers
use declining rather than constant discount rates (Gintis, 2000, Frederick et al.,
2002). Second, uncertainty over the future state of the world leads to declining
certainty-equivalent discount rates (Weitzman, 1998, Azfar, 1999, Gollier, 2002).
Third, declining discount rates are consistent with a rule, which balances the welfare
of current and future generations (Chichilnisky, 1996, Li and L¨ ofgren, 2000).
In this paper, we analyze the optimal investment in environmental protection,
given a hyperbolically discounting society, which consists of a series of non-overlapping
generations, each represented by a single agent. To capture the common pattern
of many environmental problems, we assume that the present generation faces the
costs of investment, while the beneﬁts spread over all subsequent generations.
It is well known from the literature that hyperbolic discounting bears the prob-
lem of time-inconsistency. As Strotz (1956) has pointed out, this implies that an
ex ante optimal decision is not carried out, because a later re-evaluation suggests
that it is not optimal anymore. Although the time-inconsistency property of hyper-
bolic discounting has been used to model ‘irrational’ behavior, such as addiction and
procrastination (Ackerlof, 1991, O’Donoghue and Rabin, 1999, Brocas and Carrillo,
2001, Gruber and Koszegi, 2001), there is a debate on how serious is the prob-
lem of time-inconsistency in long-term and intergenerational decision making (Heal,
1998, Henderson and Bateman, 1995, Pearce et al., 2003). In fact, if declining dis-
count rates stem from uncertainty over future states of the world there is no issue
of time-inconsistency if plans are updated as soon as better information is avail-
bale. If, however, declining discount rates are due to declining pure rates of time
preference, either because of imperfect altruism towards future generations or due
to ethical considerations balancing the welfare of present and future generations,
time-inconsistency has to be taken seriously.
Assuming hyperbolically discounting agents, we compare their investment de-
cisions under three diﬀerent behavioral patterns. Naive agents do not recognize
that their preferences are non-stationary. Thus, they do not anticipate that subse-
quent agents will not stick to their ex ante optimal plan. If agents are aware of the
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time-inconsistency problem, they are either committed if the ﬁrst agent can commit
all subsequent agents to her ex ante optimal plan, or are called sophisticated if no
commitment mechanism is availbale. Then, time-consistent planning is equivalent
to a non-cooperative sequential investment game all agents play against each other
(Phelps and Pollak, 1968). We show that, although it is ex ante optimal to do so,
neither naive nor sophisticated agents invest in later periods but not in the ﬁrst pe-
riod. Without a commitment device society is eventually stuck in a situation where
all agents prefer further investments in the long run, yet no agent will invest. As this
holds for both naive and sophisticated agents, awareness of the time-inconsistency
problem may only pose a short run remedy. Moreover, such an outcome may be
Pareto ineﬃcient and may explain why the performance of long-run environmental
policies is weak.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 the model is introduced. The
ex ante optimal plan is analyzed in section 3, while section 4 is devoted to the ex
post outcome. In section 5, we examine some of our model assumptions and discuss
implications for environmental policy. Section 6 concludes.
2 A Simple Model of Environmental Protection
Consider the following situation: Society can invest in a project that is aimed to
decrease the impact of the society’s economic activity on the natural environment.
We call this project environmental protection. Environmental protection in period
t, kt, is assumed to be a capital good, i.e., investments it in diﬀerent periods t
accumulate over time. As we focus on long-run environmental problems, we consider
environmental protection to be long lasting, and thus abstract from depreciation.
Then, the equation of motion for environmental protection is given by:
kt+1 = kt + it . (1)
For given k0 this implies that kt = k0 +
 t
τ=0 iτ. Investments it in environmental
protection are assumed to be sunk, i.e., de-investment is not possible and, thus,
it ≥ 0 holds for all periods t. To rule out solutions with ever increasing stocks of
environmental protection we assume an arbitrary but ﬁnite upper bound of envi-
ronmental protection.1 Without loss of generality we scale environmental protection
such that k(t) ∈
 
0,¯ k
 
, t ≥ 0, where ¯ k denotes the arbitrary but ﬁnite upper bound.
Society’s payoﬀ of environmental protection in period t is given by P(it,kt), which
is a strictly concave function in both arguments (partial derivatives are indicated
by subscripts throughout the paper: Pii < 0, Pkk < 0, PiiPkk − P 2
ik > 0). A central
assumption in this model is that utility costs and beneﬁts of investments in envi-
ronmental protection do not accrue at the same time. We assume that P is strictly
decreasing in it (Pi < 0) and strictly increasing in kt (Pk > 0). This implies that
costs (investments in environmental protection it) occur before the beneﬁts (stock
of environmental protection kt), as investments today accumulate the stock of the
next period.2 In addition, we assume that the marginal costs of investment are non-
1In fact, this assumption rules out Ponzi game solutions in case of sophisticated agents.
2Examples include the disposal of nuclear waste and the abatement of CO2 to slow down the
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decreasing with the level of environmental protection, i.e., there are no economies of
scale in environmental protection (Pik ≤ 0). This amounts to the assumption that
cheap options to enhance environmental quality are chosen ﬁrst and, thus, marginal
costs increase with the level of environmental protection.
We assume an inﬁnite series of non-overlapping “generations”, each the length
of one period. As an example, think of these generations as the succession of ruling
governments in a representative democracy with a period length equal to the election
period. In each period t, there is a decision maker, in the following called agent t,
who is in charge of the investment decision it in environmental protection in period
t. Each agent t cares about current and future payoﬀs, but treats past decisions
as bygone. All agents are supposed to exhibit Markov beliefs, i.e., their decisions
depend only on the payoﬀ-relevant state variable (environmental protection kt) and
not on the history of past decisions. Moreover, all agents are symmetric with respect
to intertemporal preferences. Thus, agent t’s present value of all future discounted
payoﬀs Wt equals3
Wt =
∞  
τ=0
δτP (it+τ,kt+τ) , (2)
where δτ > 0 denotes the discount factor in period t+τ, which is the product of all
per-period discount factors σν for ν ≤ τ
δτ =
τ  
ν=0
σν . (3)
Following Karp (2007) and Karp and Fujii (2008) we assume that the per-period
discount factors σν become constant after a ﬁnite time T. That is, σν = β, ν > T,
and thus δτ = δTβτ−T, τ ≥ T. We further concentrate on the case of declining
discount rates, which corresponds to (weakly) increasing per-period discount factors,
i.e., σν ≤ σν+1 < β < 1, 0 < ν < T. Without loss of generality, we normalize δ0 = σ0
to unity. We achieve standard exponential discounting for T = 0, i.e., δτ = βτ.
Quasi-hyperbolic discounting (Laibson, 1997, Laibson, 1998, Harris and Laibson,
2001, Salani´ e and Treich, 2006) corresponds to T = 1 and σ1 = αβ, 0 < α < 1,
implying that σ1 is smaller than all constant subsequent per-period discount factors
σν = β, ν > 1.
In the following, we analyze the optimal investment in environmental protection
given that agents are committed, naive or sophisticated. In particular, we derive
conditions under which all agents never invest in environmental protection although
all agents prefer investments in environmental protection in the long run.
anthropogenic greenhouse eﬀect. While the costs occur today, the beneﬁts spread over several
decades or even centuries.
3We assume that the inﬁnite sum does not diverge. Formally, this requires that in the long
run P does not grow faster than the discount factors decline: limt→∞ P(it,kt) ≤ Aβt with some
constant A > 0.
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3 Ex Ante Optimal Investment Plan
First, we derive the ex ante optimal investment plan. This is the plan agent t achieves
by maximizing intertemporal utility, assuming that all future investment decisions
will be carried out according to this plan. Note that the ex ante optimization
problem is non-stationary if T ≥ 1. This implies that an investment rule which only
depends on the stock of environmental protection, it = φ(kt), does not exist. As a
consequence, we cannot derive the ex ante optimal plan via a dynamic programming
approach.
The ex ante optimal control problem of agent t is given by:
max
{iτ}∞
τ=t
∞  
τ=0
δτP(it+τ,kt+τ) (4)
subject to (1), iτ ≥ 0, ∀τ ≥ t and given kt. As we do not assume Inada condi-
tions to hold for the payoﬀ function P, we explicitly consider corner solutions, i.e.,
iτ = 0, ∀τ ∈ [t,∞). Introducing the shadow price pk
τ for the stock of environmen-
tal protection and a Kuhn-Tucker variable pi
τ to control for the non-negativity of
investment, we obtain the following Lagrangian L:
L =
∞  
τ=0
δτP(it+τ,kt+τ) +
∞  
τ=0
p
k
τ+1 [kt+τ + it+τ − kt+1+τ] +
∞  
τ=0
p
i
τit+τ . (5)
Hence, the ﬁrst order conditions for an optimal intertemporal investment plan read:
p
k
τ+1 = −δτPi(it+τ,kt+τ) − p
i
τ , (6a)
p
k
τ+1 = p
k
τ − δτPk(it+τ,kt+τ) , (6b)
p
i
τ ≥ 0 , p
i
τit+τ = 0 . (6c)
Because of the strict concavity of the Lagrangian (strictly concave objective function
and linear restrictions), these necessary conditions are also suﬃcient if, in addition,
the following transversality condition holds:
lim
τ→∞
p
k
τkt+τ = 0 . (7)
The strict concavity of the Lagrangian L also ensures the uniqueness of the optimal
investment path {it+τ}∞
τ=0.
Equation (6b) is a diﬀerence equation, which can be solved unambiguously by
taking into account the transversality condition (7):
p
k
τ =
∞  
ν=0
δτ+νPk(iτ+ν,kτ+ν) . (8)
Thus, along the optimal investment path the shadow price of environmental protec-
tion equals the present value of the accumulated future utility gains of an additional
marginal unit of environmental protection. Inserting the shadow price of environ-
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mental protection (8) into equation (6a), we obtain the following necessary and
suﬃcient condition for an ex ante optimal plan:
−δτPi(it+τ,kt+τ) − p
i
τ =
∞  
ν=1
δτ+νPk(it+τ+ν,kt+τ+ν) , ∀τ ≥ 0 . (9)
Equation (9) states that if positive investment in environmental protection is optimal
in period t+τ (i.e., pi
τ = 0), agent t invests to such an extent that the marginal utility
loss at time t+τ due to the investment in environmental protection (left hand side)
equals the present value of the future marginal utility gains of this investment (right
hand side). However, if this condition cannot be met for any positive investment
it+τ, then no investment in environmental protection is optimal (i.e., pi
τ ≥ 0). The
following proposition characterizes the ex ante optimal investment plan:
Proposition 1 (Ex ante optimal investment plan)
For the ex ante optimal investment plan of agent t the following statements hold:
1. Optimal investment equals zero for all periods τ ≥ 0 if and only if
−
Pi(0,kt)
Pk(0,kt)
≥
β
1 − β
. (10)
2. Optimal investment in period τ = 0 equals zero if
−
Pi(0,kt)
Pk(0,kt)
≥
β
1 − β
+
1
1 − β
T  
ν=1
δν−1 (σν − β) . (11)
3. The unique steady state of environmental protection, k⋆, is given by
(a) k⋆ = kt if it+τ = 0, ∀τ ≥ 0,
(b) the unique solution of the implicit equation
−
Pi(0,k⋆)
Pk(0,k⋆)
=
β
1 − β
, (12)
if it+τ > 0 for some τ ≥ 0.
The proof of Proposition 1 is given in the appendix.
As shown in the appendix, Equations (10)–(12) are derived from the necessary
and suﬃcient condition (9) comparing costs and the discounted sum of beneﬁts of
an additional marginal unit of investment. The ﬁrst part of Proposition 1 says
that no investment is optimal from an ex ante point of view only if the costs of
the ﬁrst marginal unit of investment into environmental protection exceed the net
present value of beneﬁts at all times τ ≥ 0. As β > στ for τ ≤ T, the beneﬁts
of the ﬁrst marginal unit of investment in environmental protection in period t + τ
increase with τ until τ = T and stay constant thereafter. Thus, if there is any
investment along the ex ante optimal plan, that is condition (10) is violated, then
investment in period t+T is strictly positive but investment in former periods may
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be zero. As a consequence, the no-investment condition (10) only depends on the
long-run per-period discount factor β. In fact, comparing the costs and discounted
sum of beneﬁts for the ﬁrst marginal unit of investment at time t, the second part
gives a suﬃcient condition for which investment in the ﬁrst period τ = 0 is not
optimal. The condition is only suﬃcient but not necessary, as it may be optimal
for agent t not to invest in the ﬁrst period τ = 0 even if condition (10) is violated.
This holds, because if there is any investment in environmental protection at all
there is at least investment in period τ = T. These investments in later periods
decrease the marginal beneﬁts of investments in the ﬁrst period due to the assumed
curvature properties of P. The third part of Proposition 1 establishes the existence
of a unique steady state of environmental protection k⋆ of the ex ante optimal plan,
which is equal to the initial stock kt if no investment is optimal. Otherwise, it is
implicitly given by equation (12), which balances the long-run costs and beneﬁts of
an additional marginal unit of investment. Uniqueness follows from the assumed
curvature properties of P.
The ﬁrst and second part of Proposition 1 also imply that it may be optimal from
an ex ante perspective to invest in environmental protection in the long run but not
in the short run. In the following, we will say agent t postpones investment if it = 0
but it+τ > 0 for some τ > 0. The following corollary gives suﬃcient conditions for
postponing investment to be ex ante optimal.
Corollary 1
It is ex ante optimal for agent t to postpone investment in environmental protection
if
β
1 − β
> −
Pi(0,kt)
Pk(0,kt)
≥
β
1 − β
+
1
1 − β
T  
ν=1
δν−1 (σν − β) . (13)
The proof of Corollary 1 follows directly from Proposition 1.
Corollary 1 says that postponing investment is ex ante optimal if condition (11)
holds but condition (10) is violated. A main insight of Corollary 1 is that postponing
investment can be ex ante optimal only for hyperbolically discounting agents. If
agents discount exponentially (i.e., T = 0), the last term of the RHS of condition
(13) vanishes, and thus the condition cannot hold.4
4 Ex Post Implemented Investment
For T ≥ 1 the ex ante optimal plan of agent t is not ex ante optimal for future
agents if investment is ex ante optimal, i.e., condition (10) is violated, because of
the non-stationarity of agents’ preferences. Therefore, future agents may not stick
to the ex ante optimal plan of their predecessors. As a consequence, the investment
that is actually implemented ex post may diﬀer from the ex ante optimal plan,
4Note, however, that postponing investment can also be optimal for exponentially discounting
agents within other model frameworks. In particular, this is the case if future outcomes are risky
(see, for example, the option value framework developed by Dixit, 1992 and Dixit and Pindyck,
1994).
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depending on the behavioral pattern assumed. In the following, we analyze the ex
post implemented investment under commitment and for naive and sophisticated
agents. We show that, if condition (13) holds, i.e., investment is ex ante optimal
in the long run but not in the short run, only committed agents will invest in
environmental protection.
4.1 Commitment
If the ﬁrst agent, agent zero, has the power to enforce her ex ante optimal plan, she
will certainly do so, as this is, by deﬁnition, the unique plan which maximizes her
intertemporal utility. According to the analysis of the former section, investment in
environmental protection is ex ante optimal, if condition (10) is violated. Obviously,
in the case of such a commitment, the ex post implemented plan is equal to the ex
ante optimal plan. The following proposition summarizes this insight.
Proposition 2 (Commitment)
If all subsequent agents are committed to the ex ante optimal plan of agent zero, the
following statements hold:
1. There is no investment in environmental protection if and only if
−
Pi(0,k0)
Pk(0,k0)
≥
β
1 − β
. (14)
2. The unique steady state of environmental protection, k⋆, is given by
(a) k⋆ = k0 if it = 0, ∀t ≥ 0,
(b) the unique solution of the implicit equation
−
Pi(0,k⋆)
Pk(0,k⋆)
=
β
1 − β
, (15)
if it > 0 for some t ≥ 0.
The proof of Proposition 2 follows directly from Proposition 1.
If no commitment mechanism is available, the ex post outcome depends on the
agents’ awareness of the time-inconsistency problem. Following the standard ap-
proach, we distinguish two diﬀerent behavioral patterns.
4.2 Naive Agents
Agents are naive, if they are not aware that the ex ante optimal plans of subsequent
agents may diﬀer from their own ex ante optimal plan. As a consequence, the naive
agent invests in environmental protection if and only if it is ex ante optimal to invest
in the ﬁrst period. The following proposition elaborates on the ex post implemented
investment in case of naive agents.
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Proposition 3 (Naive agents)
If agents are naive and cannot be bound to the ex ante optimal plan of agent zero,
the following statements hold:
1. Agent t invests in environmental protection if and only if it is ex ante optimal
to invest in period t.
2. A suﬃcient condition for optimal ex ante investment in period t to equal zero
is given by condition (11).
3. For the unique steady state of environmental protection, kn, the following con-
ditions hold:
(a) kn = k0 if it = 0, ∀t ≥ 0,
(b) kn < ¯ kn where ¯ kn is given by the solution of the implicit equation
−
Pi
 
0,¯ kn 
Pk
 
0,¯ kn  =
β
1 − β
+
1
1 − β
T  
ν=1
δν−1 (σν − β) , (16)
if it > 0 for some t ≥ 0.
Proof: Ad 1. By deﬁnition naive agents believe that all succeeding agents stick to
their ex ante optimal plan. Given this believe, it is optimal for agent t to follow her
ex ante optimal plan. As a consequence, agent t only invests in period t if this is ex
ante optimal.
Ad 2. We know from Proposition 1 that condition (11) is a suﬃcient condition
for no investment to be ex ante optimal.
Ad 3. The case of no investment is trivial. Suppose investment is positive for
some t ≥ 0. Any level of environmental protection k can only be a steady state if all
subsequent agents do not invest, for which a suﬃcient condition is condition (11).
Denoting ¯ kn as the stock of environmental protection for which this condition holds
with equality, the steady state stock kn is strictly below this level, as condition (11)
is just suﬃcient but not necessary. Again, the steady state is unique due to the
curvature properties of P (see proof of part three of Proposition 1). ￿
Proposition 3 says that agent t only invests in environmental protection in period
t if the ex ante optimal plan suggests to do so. It also implies that naive agents never
invest in environmental protection if agent zero does not invest in environmental
protection, because then all subsequent agents’ ex ante optimal plans are identical
to the ex ante optimal plan of agent zero, as kt+1 = kt if it = 0. In particular, this
holds if condition (13) holds. In this case it is ex ante optimal for agent zero not
to invest herself but for future agents to invest. As naive agents do not forsee that
future agents do not stick to their ex ante optimal plan, there is no investment at all
in environmental protection over the inﬁnite time horizon although all agents prefer
investment in the long run.
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4.3 Sophisticated Agents
In contrast to naive agents, sophisticated agents anticipate future agents’ deviations
from their ex ante optimal plan. As agents can only inﬂuence future agents’ deci-
sions by inﬂuencing the stock of environmental protection, time consistent planning
of all agents can be viewed as playing a non-cooperative sequential game. We seek
symmetric Markov perfect equilibria, i.e., stationary investment rules only depend-
ing on the stock of environmental protection, it = φ(kt), which are mutually best
responses for all agents. Thus, an equilibrium investment rule satisﬁes
φ(kt) = argmax
it
 
P(it,kt) +
∞  
τ=1
P (φ(kt+τ),kt+τ)
 
, (17)
subject to equation (1) and φ(kt) ≥ 0, ∀t ≥ 0.
In order to apply a dynamic programming approach we rewrite the intertemporal
utility (2) of agent t to yield (Karp and Fujii, 2008):
Wt = P (it,kt) +
∞  
τ=1
δτP (it+τ,kt+τ)
= P (it,kt) +
T  
τ=1
δτP (it+τ,kt+τ) +
∞  
τ=T+1
βδτ−1P (it+τ,kt+τ) (18)
= P (it,kt) +
T  
τ=1
(δτ − βδτ−1)P (it+τ,kt+τ) + β
∞  
τ=0
δτP (it+1+τ,kt+1+τ) .
Then, we can write agent t’s optimization problem recursively by introducing the
value function V :
V (kt) = max
it
 
P (it,kt) +
T  
τ=1
(δτ − βδτ−1)P (φ(kt+τ),kt+τ) + βV (kt+1)
 
. (19)
Assuming a diﬀerentiable equilibrium investment rule, we obtain the following Euler
equation (as shown in the appendix):
−Pi (φ(kt),kt) ≥
T  
τ=1
(δτ−βδτ−1)[Pi (φ(kt+τ),kt+τ)φ
′(kt+τ)+Pk (φ(kt+τ),kt+τ)]
+ β [Pk (φ(kt+1),kt+1)−Pi (φ(kt+1),kt+1)] , (20)
where the inequality sign corresponds to the corner solution φ(k0) = 0. In gen-
eral, the equilibrium investment rules and the corresponding steady states are not
unique (see Karp, 2005, Karp, 2007 and Karp and Fujii, 2008). The reason is that
the equation of motion for the stock of environmental protection (1) and the Euler
equation (20) constitute an underdetermined system of equations for the unknowns
kt, φ(kt) and φ′(kt). However, the following proposition establishes that under cer-
tain conditions there exists a unique equilibrium in which all agents do not invest.
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Proposition 4 (Sophisticated agents)
If agents are sophisticated and cannot be bound to the ex ante optimal plan of agent
zero, the following statements hold:
1. No investment in all periods t ≥ 0 is the unique equilibrium if and only if
−
Pi(0,k0)
Pk(0,k0)
≥
β
1 − β
+
1
1 − β
T  
ν=1
δν−1 (σν − β) . (21)
2. For the set of asymptotically stable steady state(s) of environmental protection,
ks, the following condition holds:
(a) ks = k0 if condition (21) holds.
(b) ks ∈
 
max(k
s,k0),¯ ks 
where k
s and ¯ ks are given by the solutions of the
implicit equations
−
Pi (0,k
s)
Pk (0,k
s)
=
β
1−β
+
1
1−β
 
1 −
Pi (0,k
s)
Pk (0,k
s)
  T  
ν=1
δν−1 (σν−β) ,
(22a)
−
Pi
 
0,¯ ks 
Pk
 
0,¯ ks  =
β
1−β
+
1
1−β
T  
ν=1
δν−1 (σν − β) , (22b)
if if condition (21) is violated.
The proof of Proposition 4 is given in the appendix.
The ﬁrst part of Proposition 4 says that no agent will invest in environmental
protection if condition (21) holds, which trades oﬀ the costs and present value of
all future beneﬁts of the ﬁrst marginal unit of investment. Condition (21) is iden-
tical to condition (11), the suﬃcient condition for naive agents to never invest in
environmental protection. However, for sophisticated agents the condition is not
only suﬃcient but also necessary. The reason is that sophisticated agents antic-
pate future agents’ deviations from their ex ante optimal plan. As a consequence,
they have stronger incentives to invest compared to naive agents who postpone in-
vestments due to the ill-founded believe that later agents will invest. Note that
if condition (21) holds the equilibrium is only unique with respect to the outcome
it = 0, kt = k0, ∀t ≥ 0 but not with respect to the underlying equilibrium invest-
ment rule. In fact, all investment rules φ(kt) with φ(k0) = 0 and −1 ≤ φ′(k0) ≤ 0
are equilibrium investment rules.
An asymptotically stable steady state implies for the equilibrium investment
rule −1 ≤ φ′ (ks) ≤ 0. However, unlike the case of exponential discounting, the
restriction to asymptotically stable steady states in combination with Markov beliefs
does not yield a unique steady state in equilibrium. In fact, there exists a whole
interval of possible equilibrium steady states, whose lower bound k
s corresponds
to the equilibrium investment rule with φ′(ks) = −1 and whose upper bound ¯ ks
corresponds to the equilibrium investment rule with φ′ (ks) = 0. If k0 ≥ k
s then no
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investment in all periods is an equilibrium steady state, although (21) is violated,
but it is not the unique equilibrium.
As φ′(ks) ≤ 0, investments in environmental protection of subsequent agents
are strategic substitutes at least in a neighborhood around an asymptotically stable
steady state. That is, the more agent t invests the less agent t + 1 will invest. It
seems intuitive to think of investment decisions of subsequent agents as strategic
substitutes, as the marginal beneﬁts of investments are non-decreasing in the stock
of environmental protection (i.e., Pik ≤ 0). However, this intuition only holds for
a neighborhood around the equilibrium steady state and may be violated along the
equilibrium trajectory.
4.4 Comparison
Using Propositions 2–4, we now compare the ex post outcomes of committed, naive
and sophisticated agents. First, we compare the investment decisions between the
three behavioral regimes.
Corollary 2 (Investment comparison: now or never)
For both naive and sophisticated agents the following statement holds:
i0 = 0 ⇒ it = 0 , ∀t > 0 . (23)
The proof of Corollary 2 follows directly from Propositions 3 and 4.
Corollary 2 says neither naive nor sophisticated agents postpone investment in
environmental protection, i.e., no investment in period t = 0 but positive investment
in some later period t > 0. The reason is straightforward. Naive agents always stick
to their ex ante optimal plan. If investment is not optimal in period t the ex ante
optimal plan of agent t+1 is identical to the ex ante optimal plan of agent t, as kt+1 =
kt. Sophisticated agents invest according to an investment rule φ(kt). If φ(kt) = 0
then φ(kt+1) = 0, as kt+1 = kt. Thus, postponing investment can only occur if agent
zero can commit future agents to her ex ante optimal plan. In particular, if condition
(13) of Corollary 1 holds, there will be no investment in environmental protection in
all periods, no matter whether agents are sophisticated or naive, although all agents
would prefer investment in the long run. Thus, awareness of the time-inconsistency
of own preferences, i.e., “switching” from a naive to a sophisticated agent, does not
necessarily improve outcomes.
This does not imply, however, that investment decisions of naive and sophisti-
cated agents are identical. On the contrary, if, for example, condition (21) is just
violated5 then there exist an equilibrium investment rule with φ(k0) > 0 while it is
still not ex ante optimal to invest in t = 0 and, therefore, naive agents will never
invest. The intuition is that the beneﬁts of investments today decrease with invest-
ments in future periods. If condition (21) is just violated this also holds for condition
(14). Accordingly, it is ex ante optimal for agent zero to invest at least in the long
run, which implies iT > 0. Thus, as naive agents wrongly believe that agents in
the future will invest according to their ex ante optimal plan, investment seems less
5More formally: −
Pi(0,k0)
Pk(0,k0) = ǫ+
β
1−β + 1
1−β
 T
ν=1 δν−1 (σν − β) for some suﬃciently small ǫ > 0.
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beneﬁcial for them compared to sophisticated agents who correctly anticipate future
agents’ deviations from their ex ante optimal plan.
Second, the following corollary compares the steady states for the diﬀerent be-
havioral regimes.
Corollary 3 (Steady state comparison)
For the steady states of committed, naive and sophisticates agents the following
relationships hold:
1. k⋆ = ¯ ks = kn = k0 if condition (14) holds,
2. k⋆ > ¯ ks = kn = k0 if condition (13) holds,
3. and k⋆ > ¯ ks > kn ≥ k0 if condition (21) is violated.
The proof of Corollary 3 follows directly from Propositions 2–4.
The ﬁrst part of Corollary 3 captures the case that it is ex ante optimal to never
investment in environmental protection. Then, also naive and sophisticated agents
will never invest. The second part says that if condition (13) holds, it is ex ante
optimal to postpone investment, but there will be no investment in case of naive
or sophisticated agents. The third part refers to the case for which investment is
ex ante optimal and also sophisticated agents invest. As already outlined, this does
not necessarily imply that naive agents also invest. Moreover, the highest achievable
equilibrium steady state for sophisticated agents ¯ ks exceeds the steady state in case
of naive agents kn. Thus, in this case awareness of the time-inconsistency problem
may overcome the no investment outcome of naive agents if sophisticated agents
can coordinate on the equilibrium investment rule leading to ¯ ks. Nevertheless, even
the highest equilibrium steady state in case of sophisticated agents falls short of the
ex ante optimal steady state level of environmental protection. Thus, in the long
run both naive and sophisticated agents are stuck in a situation in which it is ex
ante optimal for them and all subsequent agents to further invest in environmental
protection, but no generation will do so. This is not only unsatisfactory for all
agents, but may also be Pareto ineﬃcient, as the following proposition states.
Proposition 5 (Eﬃciency)
For the intertemporal utility of committed, naive and sophisticated agents the fol-
lowing statements hold:
1. Enforcement of the ex ante optimal plan is always Pareto optimal.
2. The ex post implemented investment plans of naive and sophisticated agents
may be ineﬃcient in the sense that there exist Pareto superior investment
plans.
The proof of Proposition 5 is given in the appendix.
Obviously the ex ante optimal plan of agent t is Pareto optimal as any deviation
from it decreases intertemporal utility of agent t. It is not surprising that the
ex post implemented plans of naive and sophisticated agents may be ineﬃcient
(although naive agents are not aware of this fact as they always assume their ex
ante optimal plan will be carried out), it is rather surprising that they may not
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be ineﬃcient. The reason is that utility cannot be directly transferred between
diﬀerent agents. The only way of utility transfers in this model is via investments in
environmental protection. As environmental protection is assumed to be bounded,
it is not possible to compensate the utility loss of one agent due to an additional
investment by ever increasing investments of future agents (i.e., Ponzi games are
ruled out). However, whether a decreasing series of additional investments can
constitute a Pareto improvement among all agents depends on the series of per-
period discount factors.
5 Discussion
In a simple model of environmental protection we have shown that neither naive nor
sophisticated agents postpone investments even if this is ex ante optimal. Thus, if
agent zero does not invest so do all subsequent agents, although all agents prefer
investments in the long run. Of course, not all environmental problems exhibit the
property that postponing investments is ex ante optimal. But even if naive or so-
phisticated agents invest in the ﬁrst period, society will reach a long-run steady state
in which further investments are ex ante optimal but neither naive nor sophisticated
agents will invest. In addition, such an outcome may be Pareto ineﬃcient. In the
following we discuss some of our model assumptions and hint at immediate policy
implications.
We assumed that the stock of environmental protection does not depreciate.
Note that due to continuity all our results also hold for suﬃciently small rates of
depreciation. However, if depreciation is suﬃciently large, condition (21) is not
suﬃcient anymore for the no investment equilibrium to be unique for sophisticated
agents. The reason is that for positive depreciation investment decisions of sub-
sequent agents are not necessarily strategic complements in a neighborhood of the
steady state, as asymptotic stability requires that φ′(ks) ≤ γ, where γ > 0 denotes
the constant rate of depreciation of the stock of environmental protection. As a
consequence, the RHS of a corresponding suﬃcient condition for no investment to
be the unique equilibrium would increase. Then, depending on the depreciation rate
γ, we might not ﬁnd a suﬃcient condition such as condition (13) for which it is ex
ante optimal to postpone investment and neither naive nor sophisticated agents in-
vest. However, the core results that neither sophisticated nor naive agents postpone
investment, and no commitment to the ex ante optimal plan results in a steady state
in which both naive and sophisticated agents would prefer further investments in
the long run but no investments are carried out, remain untouched.
The payoﬀ function P was assumed to be time-invariant. This neglects problems
where doing nothing worsens the environmental problem such that marginal beneﬁts
of investments in environmental protection increase over time. Further, it does not
capture technological progress which decreases marginal costs of investment over
time. Both extensions may lead to investment of future agents although agent zero
did not invest and agent zero cannot commit future agents to her ex ante optimal
plan. However, even if naive or sophisticated agents do invest in later periods they
invest later and less than would be ex ante optimal, again leading to a steady state
where further investments would be ex ante optimal for all subsequent agents but
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are not carried out.
As our results are qualitatively robust, this gives rise to severe concern for
the performance of long run environmental policy if decision makers exhibit time-
inconsistent preferences and cannot easily commit themselves and future decision
makers to an ex ante optimal plan. First, we want to emphasize that the weak
policy performance with respect to some long-run environmental problems is con-
sistent with the assumption of declining discount rates of decision makers. As an
example think of the problem of nuclear waste disposal.6 It was obvious from the
very beginning of the civilian utilization of nuclear ﬁssion for energy generation in
the 1950s that there will be non-recycable wastes that are highly radioactive for
up to ten thousands of years. Yet, the solution to the disposal problem has been
continually postponed and still no long-run storage site for radioactive wastes exists.
Moreover, it was not until the 1970s that nuclear waste disposal became a source of
concern and governments commissioned research in this area.
Another example is the slow progress in stabilizing the emissions of greenhouse
gases to prevent, or at least reduce, anthropogenic climate change.7 The Framework
Convention on Climate Change, which was open to signature in Rio de Janeiro in
June 1992 and at the UN headquarters thereafter, received the signatures of 186
states. The signatory developed countries agreed as a ﬁrst step to stabilize their
greenhouse gas emissions at their 1990 levels by 2000. Most countries failed to do
so. Similar outcomes can be observed with the subsequent Kyoto protocol which
was signed in December 1997. In this treaty the developed countries agreed to
reduce their greenhouse gas emissions to 95% of their 1990 levels by 2008–2012.
Some countries which signed the protocol later refused to ratify it (e.g., USA and
Australia). Also many countries which ratiﬁed Kyoto are still far from their promised
emission targets. Moreover, the countries which already met (or are likely to meet)
their targets have done so more by accident than by deliberate action (Pearce,
2003). Both examples ﬁt well with the behavior we would expect if governments
make decisions on the basis of hyperbolic discounting (although they might be not
aware of it) and the ex ante optimal plan suggests to postpone investment to later
periods. Although governments might have intended to act in the future they fail
to do so because of the time-inconsistency of their preferences.8
Our analysis suggests that, although under certain conditions sophisticated agents
perform as badly as naive agents, awareness of the time-inconsistency problem may
be a short run remedy for the no investment outcome. As argued, sophisticated
agents may invest in environmental protection although it is ex ante optimal to
postpone investment and, thus, naive agents would never invest. However, sophis-
ticated agents would have to coordinate on the “right” equilibrium and even the
6For a more detailed exposition of the nuclear fuel cycle see, for example, Proops (2001) and
Wilson (1996).
7Although anthropogenic climate change is a stock pollutant problem which is likely to exhibit
increasing marginal damage, the case is applicable to the results of the model presented as the
Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Kyoto protocol only limit emissions.
8Of course, we do not claim that hyperbolic discounting is the only possible explanation for the
observed underperformance with respect to nuclear waste disposal and mitigating climate change.
In fact, political economy issues, public good characteristics and externalities also play a crucial
role.
www.economics-ejournal.orgEconomics: The Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal 15
maximal reachable steady state falls short of the ex ante optimal levels of environ-
mental protection. As a consequence, also sophisticated agents are eventually stuck
in a situation where further investment in the long run is ex ante optimal for all
subsequent agents but no one will invest.
6 Conclusion
We have analyzed optimal intertemporal investments in environmental protection
for a society consisting of hyperbolically discounting agents. Because of the non-
stationarity of hyperbolic preferences the ex post observed outcome crucially de-
pends on additional behavioral constraints. As prime examples we have discussed
the committed, the naive and the sophisticated agents. Within our model frame-
work neither naive nor sophisticated agents postpone investment even if this is ex
ante optimal. Thus, if agent zero does not invest so do all subsequent agents, al-
though all agents prefer investments in the long run. Such an outcome is not only
unsatisfactory for each generation, it may also be Pareto ineﬃcient.
Our results give rise to concern, as they are consistent with real world observa-
tions of weak policy performance with respect to long-run environmental problems.
Moreover, underperformance is not just a consequence of naivety, i.e., the miss-
ing awareness of the time-inconsistency problem. Although awareness of the time-
inconsistency problem may act as short-run remedy, the resulting long-run steady
states of environmental protection are below the ex ante optimal levels. Thus, if
decision makers exhibit hyperbolic preferences, we have to do more than taking
time-inconsistency seriously. We also have to overcome the (potential) ineﬃciency
of time-consistent equilibria.
Obviously, a commitment device would help. Cropper and Laibson (1999), for
example, suggest to Pareto improve the outcome by subsidizing the interest rate.
Their crucial assumption is that the eﬀect of implemented policies occur with a time-
lag, which is equivalent to a commitment mechanism for the next period. However,
they only consider quasi-hyperbolic discounting implying that only a commitment
device for one period is necessary. In the general setting of our model, commitment
for T periods would be needed. However, in a long-term intergenerational setting,
the enforcement power of the present generation is limited (and also questionable
on ethical grounds, as this implies a dictatorship of the present over the future
generations). Hence, the solution of this problem is open to future research.
Finally, it is worth noting that, although our model was primarily designed to
address long-run environmental problems, the results extend to other investment
decisions of a long-run and intergenerational nature, such as education, health in-
surance and pension schemes.
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Appendix
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Ad 1. Assume that it is optimal not to invest in all periods, i.e., it+τ = 0, ∀τ ≥ 0. Then,
it follows from (1) that kt+τ = kt, ∀τ ≥ 0. Inserting into the necessary and suﬃcient
condition (9) and recalling that the Kuhn-Tucker parameter pi
τ ≥ 0 if it+τ = 0 yields
−
Pi(0,kt)
Pk(0,kt)
≥
∞  
ν=1
δτ+ν
δτ
=

     
     
T  
ν=τ+1
δν
δτ
+
δT
δτ
∞  
ν=T+1
βν−T , τ < T
∞  
ν=1
βν =
β
1 − β
, τ ≥ T

     
     
. (A.1)
This condition has to hold for all τ for the no-investment path it+τ = 0,∀τ ≥ 0 to be
optimal from an ex ante point of view. Note that the expression for τ ≥ T is larger than
the expression for τ < T as στ < β, ∀τ ≤ T. Thus, the inequality holds for all τ ∈ [0,∞)
if it holds for τ ≥ T.
Ad 2. By assumption Pik < 0 and Pkk < 0 hold, thus
Pk(0,kt) ≥ Pk(it+τ,kt+τ) , ∀τ ≥ 0 . (A.2)
Inserting into the necessary and suﬃcient condition (9) for τ = 0, we obtain the following
condition for it = 0 to be optimal
Pi(0,kt) ≥
∞  
ν=1
δνPk(it+ν,kt+ν) ≥ Pk(0,kt)
∞  
ν=1
δν (A.3)
= Pk(0,kt)
 
T  
ν=1
δν +
∞  
ν=T+1
δν
 
= Pk(0,kt)
 
T  
ν=1
δν + δT
β
1 − β
 
= Pk(0,kt)
 
β
1 − β
+
1
1 − β
T  
ν=1
δν(1 − β) +
δTβ
1 − β
−
β
1 − β
 
= Pk(0,kt)
 
β
1 − β
+
1
1 − β
T  
ν=1
δν−1(σν − β)
 
.
In the ﬁrst line, the ﬁrst inequality stems from neglecting the Kuhn-Tucker parameter
pi
τ ≥ 0 in the necessary and suﬃcient condition (9), the second inequality sign holds due
to condition (A.2). Note that the term in brackets is smaller than β/(1 − β) because the
sum is negative as β > στ, ∀τ ≥ T.
Ad 3. The case of no investment is trivial. If investment is ex ante optimal, there
exists a τ ≥ T with it+τ > 0. Thus, the steady state cannot be reached before period
t+τ. As there is no depreciation, investment has to equal zero in the steady state. Thus,
the steady state stock of environmental protection is given by the solution of equation
(12). This solution is unique because, due to the assumed curvature properties of P, we
obtain:
∂
∂k
 
−
Pi(0,k)
Pk(0,k)
 
=
Pkk(0,k)Pi(0,k) − Pik(0,k)Pk(0,k)
Pk(0,k)2 > 0 . (A.4)
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Thus, the steady state is higher the larger is the long-run per-period discount factor β.￿
A.2 Derivation of the Euler equation
Using the value function (19) the optimization problem of agent t reads
max
it
 
P(it,kt) +
T  
τ=1
(δτ − βδτ−1)P(it+τ,kt+τ) + βV (kt+1)
 
(A.5)
subject to equation (1) and 0 ≥ iτ = φ(kτ), ∀τ ≥ t.
First, note that the following conditions hold:
∂kt+τ
∂kt
=
∂kt+τ
∂kt+τ−1
· ··· ·
∂kt+1
∂kt
= 1 ,
∂kt+τ
∂it
=
∂kt+τ
∂kt+1
∂kt+1
∂it
= 1 , ∀τ > t . (A.6)
Then, we obtain for the ﬁrst-order condition
−Pi (φ(kt),kt) =
T  
τ=1
(δτ − βδτ−1)
 
Pi (φ(kt+τ),kt+τ)φ′(kt+τ) (A.7)
+ Pk (φ(kt+τ),kt+τ)] + βV ′(kt+1) .
By the envelope theorem
V ′(kt) = Pk(φ(kt),kt) +
T  
τ=1
(δτ − βδτ−1)
 
Pi (φ(kt+τ),kt+τ)φ′(kt+τ) (A.8)
+ Pk (φ(kt+τ),kt+τ)] + βV ′(kt+1) .
Inserting the ﬁrst-order condition into V ′(kt) yields
V ′(kt) = Pk(φ(kt),kt) − Pi(φ(kt),kt) . (A.9)
Inserting back into the ﬁrst-order condition, we obtain the Euler equation
−Pi (φ(kt),kt) =
T  
τ=1
(δτ − βδτ−1)
 
Pi (φ(kt+τ),kt+τ)φ′(kt+τ) + Pk (φ(kt+τ),kt+τ)
 
+ β [Pk (φ(kt+1),kt+1) − Pi (φ(kt+1),kt+1)] . (A.10)
However, it may be that the Euler equation does not hold for non-negative investments
it = φ(kt). In this case, the optimal investment is it = φ(k0) = 0, ∀t ≥ 0 and the following
inequality holds
−Pi(0,k0t) ≥
T  
τ=1
(δτ − βδτ−1)
 
Pi(0,k0)φ′(k0) + Pk(0,k0)
 
+ β [Pk(0,k0) − Pi(0,k0)] . (A.11)
A.3 Proof of Proposition 4
Ad 1. First, note that exploding equilibria with an ever increasing stock of environmental
protection are ruled out by the boundedness of k ∈
 
0,¯ k
 
. As a consequence, the stock of
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environmental protection converges to a steady state in equilibrium. Asymptotic stability
of the steady state implies −1 ≤ φ′(ks) ≤ 0. Now, we show that if no investment is the
unique equilibrium then condition (21) holds and vice versa.
“⇒”: Suppose, no investment in all periods is the unique equilibrium. Inserting into
the Euler equation and re-arranging terms yields
−
Pi(0,k0)
Pk(0,k0)
≥
β
1 − β
+
1
1 − β
 
1 +
Pi(0,k0)φ′(k0)
Pk(0,k0)
  T  
ν=1
δν−1(σν − β) (A.12)
≥
β
1 − β
+
1
1 − β
T  
ν=1
δν−1(σν − β) .
The inequality sign in the second line holds because Pi < 0, Pk > 0, φ′ ≤ 0 and  T
ν=1 δν−1(σν − β) < 0, as σν < β,∀ν ≥ T.
“⇐”: Suppose that condition (21) holds. Suppose further that there exists an asymp-
totically stable steady state with ks > k0. Inserting into the Euler equation and re-
arranging terms yields:
−
Pi(0,ks)
Pk(0,ks)
=
β
1 − β
+
1
1 − β
 
1 +
Pi(0,ks)φ′(ks)
Pk(0,ks)
  T  
ν=1
δν−1(σν − β) (A.13a)
≤ −
Pi(0,k0)
Pk(0,k0)
+
1
1 − β
Pi(0,ks)φ′(ks)
Pk(0,ks)
T  
ν=1
δν−1(σν − β) (A.13b)
< −
Pi(0,ks)
Pk(0,ks)
+
1
1 − β
Pi(0,ks)φ′(ks)
Pk(0,ks)
T  
ν=1
δν−1(σν − β) . (A.13c)
The ‘≤’ sign in the second line holds due to condition (21), the ‘<’ sign in the third line
holds due to equation (A.4). This implies that
0 <
1
1 − β
Pi(0,ks)φ′(ks)
Pk(0,ks)
T  
ν=1
δν−1(σν − β) , (A.14)
which can only hold for φ′(ks) > 0 because Pi < 0, Pk > 0 and the sum is negative, as
σν < β,∀ν ≥ T. However, φ′(ks) > 0 contradicts the assumption of an asymptotically
stable steady state. As a consequence, the unique equilibrium is given by no investment
of all agents.
Ad 2. The case of no investment is trivial. For ii > 0 for some t ≥ 0 the following
condition holds in the steady state:
−
Pi(0,ks)
Pk(0,ks)
=
β
1 − β
+
1
1 − β
 
1 +
Pi(0,ks)φ′(ks)
Pk(0,ks)
  T  
ν=1
δν−1(σν − β) . (A.15)
We know that −1 ≤ φ′(ks) ≤ 0 for an asymptotically stable steady state. Thus, there
exists a lower and an upper bound for the set of asymptotically stable steady states, ks
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and ¯ ks, which are given by the following implicit equations:
−
Pi (0,ks)
Pk (0,ks)
=
β
1−β
+
1
1−β
 
1 −
Pi (0,ks)
Pk (0,ks)
  T  
ν=1
δν−1 (σν−β) , (A.16)
−
Pi
 
0,¯ ks 
Pk
 
0,¯ ks  =
β
1−β
+
1
1−β
T  
ν=1
δν−1 (σν − β) . (A.17)
Note that the lower bound ks corresponds to an equilibrium rule with φ′ (ks) = −1 and
the upper bound ¯ ks corresponds to an equilibrium rule with φ′  ¯ ks 
= 0. ￿
A.4 Proof of Proposition 5
Ad 1. A commitment to the ex ante optimal plan is always Pareto optimal, as the ex ante
optimal plan is unique, due to the assumed curvature properties. Thus, any deviation
from it would decrease the utility of agent zero (otherwise it would not have been optimal
in the ﬁrst place).
Ad 2. To show that the outcome of naive and sophisticated agents may be ineﬃcient,
we construct an example, for which we assume that agents discount quasi-hyperbolically,
that is T = 1 with σ1 = αβ, 0 < α < 1. We further assume that condition (13) holds,
which implies that neither naive nor sophisticated agents will invest although investment
is ex ante optimal. Thus, the following condition holds:
β
1 − β
> −
Pi(0,k0)
Pk(0,k0)
= −
P0
i
P0
k
≥
αβ
1 − β
(A.18)
To show that a Pareto improvement for naive and sophisticated agents may be possible,
consider the utility eﬀect of marginal investments ∆i0 and ∆i1 of agents zero and 1. To
keep the analysis simple we assume that all other agents do not invest. Note that the
utility of all other agents increases if agents zero and 1 increase their investments. Then,
the net utility eﬀects of the investments ∆i0 and ∆i1 for agents zero and 1 are given by:
∆W0 = ∆i0
 
P0
i + P0
k
αβ
1 − β
 
+ ∆i1αβ
 
P0
i + P0
k
β
1 − β
 
, (A.19a)
∆W1 = ∆i1
 
P0
i + P0
k
αβ
1 − β
 
+ ∆i0
 
P0
k + P0
k
αβ
1 − β
 
. (A.19b)
According to condition (A.18), for both equations the ﬁrst term is negative and the second
term is positive. If agent 1 invests to such an amount that her net utility gain is zero, we
derive for ∆i1:
∆i1 = −∆i0
P0
k + P0
k
αβ
1−β
P0
i + P0
k
αβ
1−β
> 0 . (A.20)
Inserting into ∆W0 and dividing by ∆i0 yields:
∆W0
∆i0
= P0
i + P0
k
αβ
1 − β
−
αβ
 
P0
i + P0
k
β
1−β
  
P0
k + P0
k
αβ
1−β
 
P0
i + P0
k
αβ
1−β
. (A.21)
If, for example, P0
i = −12, P0
k = 1, α = 0.5 and β = 0.95 then ∆W0/∆i0 > 0 and, there-
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fore, a Pareto improvement can be achieved if both agents depart from the no investment
equilibrium. ￿
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